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THE ANALYSIS OF DECICIONS 
ON FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND INFORMATION* 
Tadashi Fujita 
I. Introduction 
Our primary o切ecl!vesare to evaluate the value of financial leverage of 
a firm m view of various kinds of ut出tyfunctions and to study financial 
leverage in terms of informat10n. 
Teble I provides definitions of symbols that are used in this paper A 
!ilde over a symbol is used to indicate a random variable A bar indicates 
吐10expected value of a r叩 domvanable.百1ereare two fundamental 
assumptions throughout this paper: 
1羽田 rateof return on capital Tis a random variable having a finite me叩
and variance where 昨キ0.Its probability distnbution is independent 
of financial leverage. 
2.百iatthe firm could borrow uniiffilted amount at the rate of mterest i 
equal to the lendmg rate.1 
* This research was completed during the auther’s stay at Harvard, supported by 
Harvard-Yenching Institute. He would like to express his sincere出血ksto Dr. D. H. 
Perkins, Dr. R. Schlaifer and Dr. J. Prat. He greatly appreciates their instruc世ons回d
h田pitality.Of course, he is目sponsiblefor由isresult In honor of Dr. Masao 
Hisatake having his 70th birthday, he would bke to dedicate this paper to him. 
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Symbols (Table I) 
e (e,) rate of return on equity (of j) 
E equity 
FLL Financial Leverage Line 
rate of interest 
Ir quantity of prior information 
Is quantity of sample information 
K,K' constant 
L Liability 
r rate of return on total capital 
tι utility function 
v standard normal random variable; N (0,1) 
α，A coefficients of risk aversion 
β 国tioof cost of information over （子一i)
~ 加 nciallever申告
< slope of FLL 
σ，σJ Standard deviation (of j) 
r E+L一iL (!) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
e一一一一E一一
=r+(r i) 
＝γ十（γ一i）η
= （！＋η） r一zi~ 
Since r is assumed to be a random variable, e becomes a random 
vanable, too. 
e=r+ (;:；）甲
=(I＋η）子町
Expected value of e is 
i＝子＋（子－i）η 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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Standard deviation of i is 
(8) σ，＝昨（l＋ψ
(9} 
behavior of point （ισe) the ??? ??
Variance of iis 
σi＝σ，＇ (l＋胡2
Initially, we must consider 
co口espondsto the change of η 
= e r 
甲 一ー一一
γ一－ ' 
From Eq. (7) 
(10) 
We substitute Eq. (10) into Eq. (8) 
e-i 
Ue －ー ι，
r ' 
）????（
Eq. (11) is depicted as straight line ABC in the E 品 planein Fig. I. 
Point A is at甲＝ー1.This means that al equity is lent at the rate of 
mterest i. It is nsk-free 
Point B isatη＝O.百1ismeans出atthere is no liability in the capital 
structure, that is, al the capital consists only of the quity whose unlevered 
firm is operating with the rate of retun on capital bemg i'.
Po in 
BC are lir segments.羽田町ABCis called “the。1,nancialleverage 
line", （叫2The sl明日L~ is: g ＝世万
σe F;gure I 
e 
c 
eo 
???
????
??
?
」
?
σγ 
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Five types of utility function in the financial decision situation wil be 
discussed 
2. Survival Model (S Model) 
In the survival model, the rate of interest i isa critical value. Naturally, 
if出erate of return on equity dechnes to les than i, the probability of 
bankruptcy of the firm is much greater. 
Even泊出ecase of the unlevered firm B, this is because such阻
inefficient firm would fade away from the capital market So the 
probab自ityof rate of retun on equity being les血ani isdefined as the 
probability of bankruptcy. 
One should investigate the probability of bankruptcy of any firm on 
the financial leverage line 
σe Figure 2 FLL 
σ.，』一一
σr-aes』一 「一
γ＝・ ., 
Following Roy (4), it can easily be shown that 
陥孟i)＝山与i）＝山手）＝附オ）
P(ec孟i)=P(v＝毛子i.)=P（恒十）
uec t:' 
wh問石＝号子L j=B, C 
So the probability distribution of ; is assumed to be N {0,1 ). 
{12) 
(13) 
{14) 
From Eq. (12）回d{13); it is evident that whatever financial leverage of 
阻yfirm on吐lefinancial leverage lme may be, it is mdifferent for survival 
Investors who are separated from m四 agmga firm could be indifferent 
to its capital structure, but the corporate management has to take the 
問isingof capital into account. 
91 
3目 StochasticDominance Model (SD Model) 
An important issue of financial study concerns the conflict between the 
Stochastic Dominance (SD) and the Expected Value-Variance (EV〕Model
in choosing optimal portfolio of risky 臨時，asis pointed out by Burrporter 
(5). He stands for SD model. 
According to Hadar and Russel (6), Stochastic Dominance is the fact 
that the value of the cumulatJve distribution of the preferred prospect 
never exceeds that of the inferior prospect. 
At present, this Stochastic Dominance is called the first-degree 
stochastic dominance (FSD). Additionally, we have the second・ degree 
stochastic dominance (TSD) by Hadar and Russell (7), and the third-
degree stochastic dominance (TSD) by Whitmore (8). 
It has been verified that FSD implies SSD and TSD. Our discussion wil 
be confined to FSD. 
Figure 3 , FLL 
., T " e 
In the previous section, we considered the indifference between B and 
C for survival, in the c田eof P(ea孟i)and P（；，孟i).
In由issection, we wil consider the two cases e.> i and e，くi.
Case I e,> i 
Referring to Fig. 3, we c胡 easilyreason as follow: 
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P(e出.） =P（；；~！！.元主）=P（恒号工）
P(e，自，） =P（店主与生
e.-e. ;1:; e, -e, 
σe， σe, 
υ巴C
・.P(e，壬e，）孟P(e，孟e,)
Case 2；凸くz' 
We can sinularly show that 
P(e，孟e，）孟P(e，孟e,)
(I 5) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
If P（子孟i)is negligible, P( e三五i)is also negligible. In this case, C issaid 
to 'dominate B by FSD. Generally, any firm on the upper part of FLL 
stochastically donunates firms on the lower part of FLL. 3 
If P~子;1:; i) is negligible, B wil stochastically dominate C. 
If r is at times les than i, and another times more than i", there IS no 
stochastic donunance between Band C. 
σe 
4. Expected-Value-Standard Deviation Model (ESD Model) 
τbe utility function u of this model is the following function. 
u=ii一λσe
＝（子 λ時）＋（子 E一λ昨）叩
where λrs the coefficient of nsk aversion 
Figure 4 
σe 
FLL FLLσe 
ケ u 
{a) e {b) e 
子－iー λUr量O＜＝二〉λ重主子i.=-!-町，.
メ
u 
{c) 
(20) 
(21) 
FLL 
e 
(22) 
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whereσγキO
I 1 
Ifλくt,u isan increasing fur叫 onw油田gardto叩．τherefore,the 
optimal value of引sinfinite to m阻 imi田 u.(Fig. 4(a)) 
I山 t，叫白n叩
Ifλ＞ T , uisa decreasi 釦nctio ith regard t。甲 Then,the optimal 
value of可is0, that is, unlevered, provided that lending 1s not permitted 
If lendmg is feasible, the optimal value 1sη＝ー 1.
百四 optimalbehaviots of financial leverage atλ＝land λ乏よmthe s s 
ESD model are equivalent to those of the S model and SD model, 
respectively 4 
5. Expected Value-Variance Model (EV Model) 
The ut丑ityfunction in EV model is as folios: 
1 , 
u=e-2aσe 
＝子＋（子－ i)~ －fal (l＋甲）＇
where αis the coefficient of risk aversion. 
σ•I Figure 5 
FLL 
tι 
e 
The necessary condition to maximize u with regard to ~ 1s 
告＝（子トd 川）＝O
Therefore, the optimal value of ~ is 
( i'-i）ー αd
甲二一一一τττ一一一一一
u 町
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
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We can not get uniquely any optimal白nitevalue of甲tomaximize the 
utility functions in S, SD，叩dESD models, other than the extreme points 
甲＝ー1or甲＝O.
On the other hand, the optimal value of甲 isfinite using Eq. (25) in 
E-Vmodel. 
αie must recogruze the difference between Expected Value-Standard 
Deviation model and Expected Value-Variance model 
The quadratic utility function like E-V model has been criticized for 
several yea四
Pratt (I) said that a quadratic utility could not be a decreasing 
risk-averse on any mterval and that this severely limited the usefullness of 
quadratic utility, however nice it would be to have expected utility depend 
only on the me皿 andvariance of the probability distribution. 
Arrow (12) also discussed the same results. 
Lin也r(!) criticized normality and derived “market opportumty line”， 
skillfully using Roy’s survival model. 
In the following section, we will construct a model, mainly following 
Pratt. 
6. Decre叩ngRisk Aversion Model (DRA Model) 
In his paper, the functionr(x）＝イ（x)/u'(xlisdefined as a measure of 
local risk aversion, and considered a measure of the concavity of u atthe 
point x where x 1sthe amount of holding a田ets.
“A m皿’sutility system is the result of his social situal!on, and of 
society around him. But his social situation dep叩 dsin turn on economic 
organ12ation”，said Marris (13). 
Referring to his ideas, 1t seems to me that a man 1s decreasing a degree 
of nsk aversion ag温nsta given nsk as he reaches the empire of power 
So x isdefined as a measure of holding not only assets, but also other 
managerial powers of the firm. 
Expected utility is as follows 
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El包（x+e)
＝旬（x）＋制xl+す（σ・i＋刊凶＂（ x) （沼8 ） 
＝包（x
十〔子＋（子一i）η〕＇lu＂（お） (29 ） 
The日rstderivative of Eq. (29) with respect to~ ， is the following 
dElu(x+e)! 一一一一一一＝ (T-1）山）＋lar＇＋（ 子一川dη 
＋〔σρ＋（子－ i ）＇ 〕 ~Iu "(xl (30) 
The necessary conditi叩 tomaxinnze E〔u(x+e）〕 withrespect toηis 
dE_n 
d甲 u
Therefore 
where 
η 
（子 1）ー〔σγ＇＋子（子－ i）〕γ（x)
［σr+ (r-i)' J r(x) 
u"(x) 
r(x)= 一一一一’（x) 
(31) 
(32) 
Thisηm the DRA model is correspondent to that of that in the E-V 
model. r(x) is toαm Eq. (26）.αis a constant but r(x) is a decreasing 
function of x So thatηis an increasing function of x. In other words, 
financial leverage will increase as the assets and other resources of a firm 
increase. 
We can not recogmze the behavior of financial leverage in the dynamic 
setting without using r(x) . So Eq. (31) is very helpful to study the 
dynamic financial leverage But, since we can keep r(x) constant to study 
financial leverage in the static state, the ηof Eq. (26) is useful instead of 
the of Eq. (31). 
In the next section, we would like to analyse financial leverage further, 
μsmg E-V model, mainly because it is much easier to manipulate the of Eq. 
(26) than that of Eq. (31 ). 
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7. Financial leverage, Risk aversion and Information 
In this sect10n we will℃onsider the next two relat10ns using Eq (26) 
Case a: betwee!l financial leverage and nsk avemon 
Case b between financial leverage and information 
Case a between financial leverage and risk aversion 
The function甲（α）is depicted at Fig・7where given主＞.iand σT宇0.
η1s needed to be les than or equal to 3 by the rule of tuumb Using 
Eq (25), the value of a 1sat可＝3,
" 
3' 
。
-! 
一 γ一
r ' 
4σf 
1 I子－iI α＝ I 4 l ・,' J 
At可＝O,the value of αis ' 
α＝＝ー一一τ一σャ
From Eq. (33）叩d(34), 
α｛竺型＿＿.1 
αγ＝的 4
F;gure 7 
r ' 
u,' 
unlevered 
firm 
α 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
百tisrule ’of thumb says出at,ceteris paribus, the decision-maker 
should not hveαleis than a 'fourth of the unlevered coefficient of 
risk avers10n 
Many Japane四 compa凶eshave η＞ 3 . For instance, the可ofthe 
Mitsubishi Trading Company is 30.44 and that of the Mitsui Bussan 
Company is 28.85，担 1973.
At可＝29, the value ofαis, 
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α＝品医＋－］ (36) 
百四αisa thirtieth of由eunlevered coefficient of risk aversion. 
Case b: between financial leverage and informat10n 
_lτ＝Ir, is called出equantity of mformation by Raiffa and Schlatfer 
σT 
(14). Substituting Ir .into Eq.ο6). 
η＝十（ト印 1 (37) 
~ 
-1 
Figure 8 
a － r-1 Ir 
The optimal leverage of a firm is a linear increasing function of the 
quantity of information which the firm has in the data bank. 
Given可andα， 
(1 ＋η）α＝（子－i)Ir=K (Const.) (38) 
Let the quantity of additional sample information of r be Is and its 
cost beβ% of (r-i). Assume that the sample mean is the same as r. 
γー－I 、
、、、
Figure 9 
色、、
，ー一 、.
～－ ＿－＿.、もιB’
、ー 、、句、
、、『ー－K’
K 
Ir 
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At Fig 9, point A stands for the state of havmg prior informat10n. 
The condition that point B remains on the same trade-off curve k as 
pomt A does will be derived. 
In order to get the condit10n, we have吐iefollowing equation, using 
Bayes' Theorem. 
（子 i)Ir= （子－i)(1ー β）(Ir+ Is) (39) 
・βー Isゴ干芋7工 (40) 
If the cost山 eadditional informat…叩alt叶五（子。
we can reach point B 
川 ecost凶田出阻古五（子一川ieoptirr 
shifting into curve K', givenα 
Conclusion 
Among our models, S Model, SD Model and ESD Model have no finite 
optimal financial leverage. In order to get finite optimal financial leverage, 
EV Model or DRA Model has to be used. 
EV Model is criticized in terms of DRA Model. But it is easy to 
manipulate EV Model So that we considered the relations between 
financial leverage and risk aversion, and between financial leverage and 
information m terms of EV Model with caution paid to its criticism 
It is interesting to say that financial leverage is much connected with 
information, given risk aversion. 
(November 3, 1974) 
Notes 
I) Assumption 2 isthe same as Lintner (I) did. (p. I) 
2) The close relationship between Fisher’s“Market Opportunity Line”（2) or 
Sh町pe’s“CapitalMarket Line”（3) in portfolio出eory,and our financial leverage 
line should be noted. (p. 3) 
3) The fact that皿 efficientportfolio with high mean -high st回 darddeviation is 
preferred according to SD田 Burrporter(5) did h田 somethingto do wi由 the
、abovementioned characteristic of SD. (p. 6) 
4) Baumol (9) considered dominant portfolio in出eESD model using his“lower 
confidence limit, L” 
L=E-kσ 
In his (E. L) model, 
σ＝／（E) 
σ＇＝／’（E) >O 
σ”＝／＂（ E)>O 
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But in our model，σe isa linear increasing function of Taking into account this 
difference, our result from the ESD model is consistent with his results. (p. 7) 
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財務挺子率と情報の決定分析
〈要約〉
藤田忠
財務的意思決定者が生存モデノレ，確率的支配モデル，期待値 標準偏
差モデル，期待値 分散モテ勺レおよび逓滅的危険回避モデルの効用関数
をとったとき，財務挺子率がどのような態様を示すかを研究した。その
結果，生存，確率的支配，期待値ー標準偏差モテコレでは有限な（ただし，
財務挺子率＝－ 1あるいはO以外の）最適な財務挺子率がないかあるい
はどのような挺子率をとっても無差別である場合以外ないことが明らか
にされた。
期待値一分散モデルはPrattあるいはArrowによる逓滅的危険回避モ
テソレの観点から批判されている。期待値一分散モデノレ色局所的には利用
可能である点を考慮して， EVモデルによって，さらに次の2点を検討
した。
ケース a 財務挺子率と危険回避
ケース b: 財務挺子率と情報
ケース aにおいて財務挺子率と危険回避係数との関係を考察した。 ζ
れによって，企業の財務行動が効用理論1r立つ意思決定モテりレle関連が
つけられた。
ケースbによって，危険回避係数が所与ならば，財務挺子率は情報シ
ステムと関連を持っていることが指摘される。ベイズ決定理論を用いて，
経済的な情報が利用可能ならば，最適財務挺子率が増加する Eとが示さ
れた。
